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BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE
rather than a general memory process (Schneider and Sherman, 
1968; Squire et al., 1976). In subsequent years, Lewis and col-
leagues went on to address this criticism and developed a cog-
nitive approach to cue-dependent amnesia (Lewis, 1976). On 
the basis of this work, Lewis (1979) proposed a novel theory of 
memory. Accordingly, initially new memories are in an unstable 
active state and stabilize over time into an inactive state. Active 
and inactive states are akin to the short- and long-term memory 
stages (respectively) of the consolidation hypothesis of memory 
(McGaugh, 1966). The novelty of Lewis’s model was his proposal 
that the act of remembering returns inactive memories into an 
active state, whereas the original consolidation theory suggested 
that the instability period happens only once when the memory 
is formed.
During the time the reconsolidation hypothesis evolved, there 
were two attempts to examine these ideas in humans albeit in ways 
fundamentally different from the animal research. The first was a 
translational study trying to make clinical use of the phenomenon 
of cue-dependent amnesia. Rubin (1976) and Rubin et al. (1969) 
adapted Lewis’s animal protocol to human patients suffering from 
obsessive-compulsive  disorder  (OCD)  and  hallucinations.  The 
equivalent of the animal retrieval cue was to prompt the patients 
to focus on the subject matter of their psychopathology (e.g., fear of 
contamination). Rubin assumed that this would return their mala-
daptive memory into an active state vulnerable to disruption. He 
then administered his patients with electroconvulsive shock (ECS), 
just as in the animal protocol. In contrast to the animal protocol, 
however, where a simple memory was created in the laboratory, 
here the patients brought their own real life memories. The results 
were consistent with the reconsolidation hypothesis in that the 
A brief history of humAn reconsolidAtion
Attempts to Alter reconsolidAtion in humAns
The origin of today’s reconsolidation hypothesis is in the studies 
reported by Donald Lewis and colleagues during the late 1960s 
(Misanin et al., 1968; Lewis, 1969). These studies established the cri-
teria to which an experimental protocol of reconsolidation should 
obey: (1) Reactivate a consolidated memory by means of a reminder 
cue; (2) Administer the treatment aimed at altering reconsolidation 
post reactivation and not prior to it; (3) Test for retention after the 
effects of the treatment have dissipated and the window of recon-
solidation has closed. Because reconsolidation is a process affecting 
long-term memory storage (or re-storage), short-term memory 
immediately after treatment should be intact. If the memory is 
no longer expressed following this protocol (compared to control 
groups with no treatment after reactivation, or treatment without 
reactivation) it is possible to claim that there is a consolidation 
process occurring with retrieval, and the treatment was effective in 
blocking it. This phenomenon was initially termed “cue-dependent 
amnesia” (Misanin et al., 1968; Lewis, 1969) and only later was 
referred to as “reconsolidation” (Spear, 1973; Przybyslawski and 
Sara, 1997).
The initial studies supporting the reconsolidation hypothesis 
were exclusively based on motivationally driven learning, such 
as aversive Pavlovian conditioning (Misanin et al., 1968; Lewis, 
1969; DeVietti and Holliday, 1972; DeVietti and Kirkpatrick, 
1976), passive avoidance (Gordon and Spear, 1973), hypothermia 
(Mactutus et al., 1979), or complex maze tasks with food reward 
(Lewis et al., 1972; Lewis and Bregman, 1973). This triggered 
the criticism that cue-dependent amnesia could be attributed 
to the heightened state of arousal induced by the reminder cue 
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doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2011.00024patients’ OCD symptoms were altered. The patients reached levels 
of improvement that were not observed when ECS was previously 
given under anesthesia.
The second attempt created new memories in a laboratory 
setting using more traditional tasks examining non-emotional, 
episodic memory. In this study, Squire et al. (1976) used ECS on 
depressed psychiatrist patients. Their goal was to examine per-
formance on a battery of memory tests including object recogni-
tion, paired-associate learning, as well as remote memories. The 
results showed that reactivating memories just before ECS did not 
produce amnesia. In other words, they failed to find evidence for 
reconsolidation in humans, as did a few other studies in animals 
around that time (Banker et al., 1969; Dawson and McGaugh, 1969; 
Weaver and Magnus, 1969; Jamieson and Albert, 1970; Gold and 
King, 1972). Squire and colleagues speculated that their results 
had to do with the fact that their human subjects were not under 
a state of arousal or heightened motivation, as were the animals in 
previous studies. As mentioned above, the initial animal studies of 
this phenomenon typically used footshocks or hunger to motivate 
learning. Squire and colleagues claimed that cues associated with 
such experimental settings are bound to highly arouse the animal 
when presented. What these studies measured, they claimed, was 
the interactive effects of ECS and arousal on performance and not 
a direct effect of ECS on memory. Because Squire and colleagues 
examined neutral episodic memories instead of memories linked 
to emotional consequences they could avoid such interaction. They 
therefore concluded that “previously learned material is not easily 
disrupted by simply calling it to mind before treatment” (p. 342).
Why Squire and colleagues failed to find evidence for the dis-
ruption of reconsolidation is unclear. The arousal explanation was 
refuted by other studies in non-human animals (Lewis, 1976). It 
could be that the ECS treatment was insufficient as its effects on 
initial consolidation were anyway mild. Or perhaps an important 
factor was that Squire and colleagues examined neutral episodic 
memories, which have a different neural representation than emo-
tional associative memories. As we describe below, inconsistent 
findings are the hallmark of extant human reconsolidation research. 
Indeed, one of the major challenges to human reconsolidation 
research is to reconcile findings from studies examining different 
memory systems and identifying the potential interactions between 
them.
the mAlleAbility of humAn episodic memory
Around the same time these first few human reconsolidation studies 
appeared, a similar idea emerged within the cognitive psychology 
literature, suggesting memory is not a snapshot of the original 
event, but rather an ongoing process that incorporates new infor-
mation available at the time of retrieval. The roots of this idea began 
with James (1892) who argued that memory is constantly chang-
ing due to being retrieved in different cognitive environments. 
Bartlett (1932) provided experimental support for this hypothesis 
by showing that the more subjects were to retrieve information, the 
more it was biased toward their cultural expectations. But perhaps 
the most compelling evidence for the dynamic nature of memory 
comes from a large body of work in cognitive psychology on the 
malleability of human memory. Research over the past 30 years 
has shown that information, and even more so, misinformation, 
could profoundly influence old memories if provided at the time of 
retrieval (Tulving and Thomson, 1973; Loftus, 1979, 1981, 2005a,b; 
Loftus and Yuille, 1984; Lindsay and Johnson, 1989; Johnson et al., 
1993; Schacter, 1999; Roediger et al., 2007).
In a classic study that helped re-energize the debate of the nature 
of memory malleability, Loftus et al., (1978) presented subjects 
with a series of slides depicting an automobile accident involving 
either a “stop” sign or a “yield” sign. At a later time, subjects were 
given a questionnaire that presented misinformation about the 
nature of the sign (e.g., a “stop” sign was referred to as a “yield” 
sign). For a large proportion of the subjects, this misinformation 
was incorporated into subsequent memory for the accident. The 
mechanisms underlying the nature of this misinformation effect 
were hotly debated. In their initial research, Loftus and colleagues 
suggested that new information is integrated into the old memory, 
resulting in the reconstruction of a memory that was never experi-
enced. Others argued against this integration or re-writing hypoth-
esis suggesting that the original memory is not altered; rather the 
misinformation effect occurs because subjects forget the original 
event and are lured into responding with the incorrect informa-
tion (McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985). It was also suggested the 
misinformation effect could be due to misattributing the source 
of the inconsistent information, with or without an intact original 
memory trace (Lindsay and Johnson, 1989).
As this classic research in cognitive psychology suggests, view-
ing memory as fundamentally dynamic is in fact an old tradition 
in cognitive psychology without using the term “reconsolidation.” 
However, the debate about the nature of the storage (or re-storage) 
mechanism underlying the misinformation effect and other find-
ings demonstrating the malleability of human memory has not 
been conclusively resolved based on the psychological literature 
alone. As we suggest below, the reconsolidation hypothesis, and 
our increasing understanding of its neurobiological underpinnings, 
may provide an alternative framework for interpreting this litera-
ture and provide novel insights into this old debate (see Hardt et al., 
2009 for an interesting review bridging animal reconsolidation with 
cognitive psychology).
the current stAte of humAn reconsolidAtion
WhAt hAppened in the lAst decAde?
Research of human reconsolidation has evolved only in recent years 
(Table 1). This is perhaps not surprising given that the reconsolida-
tion field as a whole was silent for the most part during the last five 
decades. The early studies of the 60s and 70s, and those of the last 
decade, represent the birth and the rebirth of the field, respectively. 
Human reconsolidation research shares the same dynamics albeit 
in drastically smaller numbers. While research with non-human 
animals has produced over 300 papers just in the last 10 years, 
human research provided about 13. Below we discuss the reasons 
for these disproportionate numbers, the current state of research on 
reconsolidation in humans, and the substantial challenges ahead.
Amygdala-dependent memories
The vast majority of animal studies on reconsolidation have used 
aversive Pavlovian conditioning as the paradigm of choice (Sara, 
2008; see for example Nader et al., 2000). In this procedure, a neutral 
stimulus, such as a tone, is paired with an aversive outcome, such 
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caused their PTSD using a standard script preparation form that 
takes about 20 min. Immediately after this script-driven retrieval, 
half the patients received propranolol (a short acting 40 mg pill 
and a long acting 60 mg pill 2 h later). The other half received 
matching placebos, and the administration was randomized and 
double-blind. One week later, the patients were reminded again of 
their traumatic memory by listening to a recording describing the 
traumatic event. The recording was prepared in advance by one 
of the investigators based on the scripts, and they were asked to 
imagine the events while listening. At that time, their physiological 
responses were recorded using measures of autonomic nervous 
system arousal (heart rate and skin conductance response, or SCR) 
and electromyogram (EMG) of the facial frowning muscle (the left 
corrugator). The investigators compared the level of these physi-
ological measures to normative cut-offs for PTSD based on prior 
research. They found that heart rate and SCR levels were above 
normative PTSD cut-offs in the placebo group, but below in the 
propranolol group, although not significantly below the PTSD cut-
off for SCR. The EMG responses were below the normative cut-offs 
in both groups and therefore were not indicative of drug-induced 
reduction of the expression of negative affect.
These results suggest that propranolol given after reactivation 
of a traumatic memory might be effective in reducing some of the 
maladaptive physiological responses triggered by the memory. As of 
yet, it is unclear if this is a long-lasting effect, and if the administra-
tion of propranolol during the reconsolidation period is effective 
in reducing PTSD symptomatology as well, which is the ultimate 
goal of the treatment. Directly linking the effects of propranolol 
to reconsolidation from these results, however, should be done 
with caution. In the absence of a control group that receives pro-
pranolol without memory reactivation it is impossible to rule out 
the possibility that propranolol had more general effects that are 
not necessarily related to reconsolidation (Nader, 2003).
Shortly after the publication of these results, another study 
reported using propranolol but this time in healthy volunteers 
that underwent fear conditioning (Kindt et al., 2009). The use of a 
normal population and experimental procedures that closely mimic 
animal research allows for appropriate controls and better interpre-
tation of the results (Rasmusson and Charney, 1997; Myslobodsky 
and Weiner, 2000). This is naturally harder to achieve in clinical 
populations, which are less available and introduce significant vari-
ability across participants. Kindt et al. (2009) fear-conditioned their 
subjects by presenting fear-relevant images (spiders) on a computer 
screen and pairing them with a mild electric shock to the wrist. 
There were two spider images – one was designated as the condi-
tioned stimulus (CS) and was paired with the shock (the uncondi-
tioned stimulus, or US) and the other was never paired. A day later 
they reactivated the memory using a single presentation of the CS. 
Propranolol was administered 1.5 h before memory reactivation. 
On the following day, the stimuli were presented again 10 times 
each without the US (extinction session). After extinction, a few 
non-signaled shocks were given in order to reinstate the memory 
(Bouton, 2002), and this was followed by another extinction session. 
The investigators had two measures of fear: (1) fear-potentiated 
startle, where the indication of conditioned fear is the potentiation 
of the eyeblink startle reflex to a loud noise (the startle reflex is 
as a shock. After a few pairings, a fear response is triggered by the 
tone itself because of its association with the shock. A day later, 
after allowing the memory to be fully consolidated into long-term 
storage, the tone alone is presented only once, serving as a reminder 
cue. This reactivation cue is what presumably triggers the recon-
oslidation process. Evidence for the timing of reconsolidation, or 
the reconsolidation “window,” is still emerging, but it is thought 
to require somewhere between 3 and 10 min after reactivation for 
the reconsolidation process to begin and it lasts at least an hour or 
more (Monfils et al., 2009). By 6 h the reconsolidation process is 
complete (Nader et al., 2000; Duvarci and Nader, 2004). Interfering 
with reconsolidation by pharmacological or behavioral means dur-
ing this window blocks or alters the re-storage of the memory. This 
is apparent when examining the animal’s response to the tone when 
it is presented again 24 h later. Importantly, there is no interference 
when examining short-term memory before the reconsolidation 
process is complete.
A long line of research in non-human animals suggests that the 
acquisition, storage, and expression of conditioned fear, require an 
intact amygdala. The lateral nucleus of the amygdala is thought to 
be the site of storage for conditioned fear memories (see LeDoux, 
2000 for a review). Because of this, studies examining consolida-
tion (LaBar et al., 1998; Fanselow and LeDoux, 1999; Davis, 2000; 
LeDoux, 2000; Maren, 2001; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Schafe et al., 
2005) and reconsolidation (Nader et al., 2000; Duvarci et al., 2005; 
Jin et al., 2007) have focused on this brain region. For example, 
Nader et al. (2000) injected a protein synthesis inhibitor directly 
into the lateral amygdala during reconsolidation of conditioned 
fear. It was already known that inhibition of protein synthesis blocks 
reconsolidation (Judge and Quartermain, 1982) but the particular 
locus within the neural circuitry of fear conditioning was unknown. 
Nader and colleagues then tested the rats a day later, in the absence 
of the drug. These rats no longer showed fear of the tone, compared 
to rats that received placebo injection following reactivation, or 
drug without reactivation. The protein synthesis inhibitor had no 
effect when testing the rats 4 h after reactivation. This suggests that 
the short-term memory was intact, and only the long-term memory 
was impaired through effects of the drug on reconsolidation.
In humans, only four published studies have examined recon-
solidation of amygdala-dependent memories. It is impossible to use 
protein synthesis inhibitors in humans because they are highly toxic. 
Alternatively, it is safe to use beta-adrenergic receptor blockers, such 
as the drug propranolol, which may modulate protein synthesis 
(Gelinas and Nguyen, 2005) and thereby may regulate long-term 
memory storage. Indeed, propranolol has similar effects as protein 
synthesis inhibition when injected systematically or directly into the 
rat amygdala (Debiec and LeDoux, 2004). Below we describe the 
details of three published studies using this drug, one unpublished 
study, and one proposing a non-invasive technique.
The  first  study  directly  implemented  the  reconsolidation 
hypothesis in a clinical population. Brunet et al. (2008) examined 
19 individuals with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD is 
a chronic syndrome marked by intrusive and distressing memories 
of intensely emotional events. The symptoms and susceptibility 
to PTSD have been linked with an over-reactive amygdala (Rauch 
et al., 2006; Admon et al., 2009; Brohawn et al., 2010; Brunetti 
et al., 2010). To reactivate the traumatic memory in this study, 
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Soeter and Kindt (2010), we found evidence of conditioned fear 
on the Day 3 test in all three groups. However, a detailed analysis 
of our data suggested a transient effect of propranolol. That is, 
subjects who received propranolol on Day 2 showed no evidence 
of conditioned fear on the first trial of the Day 3 test. By the second 
trial (12 s later) conditioned fear returned. Although our temporary 
disruption of fear memory with administration of propranolol was 
suggestive of a partial disruption of conditioned fear, this paradigm 
was ultimately unsuccessful. However, the pattern of results we 
obtained provides some hints as to factors that may be important 
to consider in future efforts to disrupt the reconsolidation of con-
ditioned fear in humans using propranolol.
Specifically, the temporary disruption of fear suggests that 
something must be driving the return of the fear response. We 
hypothesize that this return of fear may be the result of subjects 
having intact explicit knowledge or episodic memory of the rela-
tionship between with the CS and the US. There is abundant 
evidence that knowledge of the CS–US contingency alone, in the 
absence of pairing of the CS and US and fear conditioning, can 
result in a physiological fear response that is almost identical to 
conditioned fear (see Olsson and Phelps, 2007, for a review). 
This episodic memory top-down driven fear response has been 
most frequently observed as measured with potentiated star-
tle (Grillon et al., 1991, 1994; Funayama et al., 2001), but has 
also been observed with SCR (Phelps et al., 2001). Interestingly, 
although the acquisition and storage of explicit knowledge of the 
CS–US contingency does not depend on the amygdala (Bechara 
et al., 1995; LaBar et al., 1995), the physiological expression of 
this fear representation is amygdala-dependent (Funayama et al., 
2001). In our unsuccessful study described above (Miller et al., 
unpublished), it is possible that the first trial of the Day 3 test 
served to remind the subjects of their episodic memory of the 
CS–US contingency, which led to a return of the fear response. 
Critically, these findings highlight the importance of understand-
ing the relationship between different memory systems and fear 
representations when developing protocols to disrupt fears by 
influencing reconsolidation mechanisms.
In addition to the temporary fear disruption in this study, there 
were three other unexpected results. First, this disruption of fear was 
only observed in female participants. There is evidence that females 
metabolize propranolol differently than males (Walle et al., 1994a,b), 
which could impact the success of this treatment in influencing 
reconsolidation. Second we observed both a temporary decrease 
in SCR to the CS, and an increase in SCR to a second stimulus that 
was explicitly not paired with shock (i.e., a CS- or safety stimulus). 
The amygdala may code both fear and safety memories (Phelps 
et al., 2001; Rogan et al., 2005; Schiller et al., 2008; Ostroff et al., 
2010) and it is possible that our temporary memory disruption may 
have inadvertently influenced both. Finally, we found an effect for 
propranolol on the expression of fear, regardless of whether the fear 
memory was reactivated. Our subjects who received propranolol 
with no reactivation cue may have generated the cue themselves 
by simply being placed back in the hospital context. This finding 
suggests that either propranolol had a more general fear dampening 
effect, or alternatively, it may be difficult to precisely control memory 
reactivation in human subjects.
initially habituated) during the presentation of the CS; (2) explicit 
knowledge of the contingency between the CS and the US. This 
was measured through online shock-expectancy ratings that the 
subjects indicated at the beginning of each trial (the shock itself co-
terminated with stimulus presentation). The experimental groups 
were: propranolol with reactivation, placebo with reactivation, and 
importantly, propranolol without reactivation. The investigators 
found that only the group that received memory reactivation in 
conjunction with propranolol failed to show conditioned fear at 
extinction and also after reinstatement. In contrast, subjects who 
were reminded of the conditioned fear but got placebo, or got only 
propranolol without reactivation, continued to show conditioned 
fear. These results, however, were obtained only with the fear-
potentiated startle measure. According to the explicit knowledge 
ratings, all subjects remembered the image-shock contingency, and 
appropriately expected the shocks throughout.
Although this initial study was encouraging, there are several 
issues with the Kindt et al. (2009) study that suggest a mechanism 
other than the blocking of the reconsolidation of conditioned fear. 
The primary issue is that propranolol was given 1.5 h prior to reactiva-
tion and reconsolidation. This detail creates a major caveat in linking 
the effects of the drug with reconsolidation. The reason the authors 
chose to do so is that it takes about 90 min for propranolol to reach 
peak plasma concentration in the blood (Gilman and Goodman, 
1996). The authors coordinated the peak level with memory reactiva-
tion, not memory reconsolidation. Because of this, they cannot rule 
out effects of the drug on retrieval itself. It could be that retrieval of 
the fear memory in the presence of the drug had a lasting effect on 
the expression of the fear potentiated startle measure, rather than 
blocking the reconsolidation of the fear memory itself.
Consistent with this hypothesis, in a follow up study using a 
similar procedure with another measure of conditioned fear this 
same group failed to find evidence that reactivation of the fear 
memory after the administration of propranolol disrupts the later 
expression of fear conditioning (Soeter and Kindt, 2010). These 
inconsistent results suggest that their procedure is only partially 
effective at altering the expression of conditioned fear. Importantly, 
their second measure was autonomic nervous system arousal as 
assessed with SCR. Clinically, autonomic nervous system arousal is 
a primary symptom of fear related disorders, such as PTSD. SCR is 
also the most frequently assessed measure of amygdala-dependent 
conditioned fear in humans (see Phelps and LeDoux, 2005 for a 
review), and the only one that has been linked to focal amygdala 
damage (Bechara et al., 1995). This lack of replication provides 
further support for the suggestion that the administration of pro-
pranolol prior to reactivation may have altered the later expression 
of potentiated startle, rather than disrupting the reconsolidation 
of the conditioned fear memory.
Interestingly, the latter finding is consistent with results obtained 
in our laboratory (Miller Altemus, Debiec, LeDoux, and Phelps, 
unpublished). Our study had a similar design as Kindt et al. (2009) 
with the three experimental groups undergoing fear conditioning, 
with Day 1: acquisition, Day 2: reactivation followed by propranolol 
or placebo (or no reactivation followed by drug), and Day 3: test of 
conditioned fear. The primary difference was that we administered 
propranolol immediately after reactivation to assure that we were 
testing the effect of propranolol on reconsolidation, rather than 
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had regular extinction without reactivation, which was expected 
(Bouton, 2002). As for the two groups exposed to the reactivation 
cue, only the one that underwent extinction 6 h later, outside the 
reconsolidation window, showed fear recovery. The group that 
underwent extinction training 10 min after reactivation, within the 
reconsolidation window, showed no recovery of fear. Interestingly, 
this effect persisted at a follow up test a year later. In a second study, 
we also showed that this manipulation was effective in preventing 
the reinstatement of one CS but not another within the same indi-
vidual. To this aim we presented subjects with three colored squares. 
Two of them were paired with a shock and the third was not. We 
subsequently reactivated only one of the CSs. Extinction training 
with all three stimuli followed this. When tested a day later after 
reinstatement, only the non-reactivated CS elicited a conditioned 
fear response. There was no evidence of a return of fear to the CS 
that was reactivated 10 min prior to extinction training.
These results are consistent with a study in rats that used a simi-
lar protocol whereby extinction interfered with reconsolidation 
of conditioned fear and demonstrated comparable effects on rats’ 
freezing behavior (Monfils et al., 2009). Together, these studies show 
that introducing new safety information during reconsolidation 
of a conditioned fear memory might lead to the re-storage of this 
memory as safe, and permanently change its fearful properties. 
An animal study of hippocampal-dependent memories reported 
in this issue (Lee, 2010) supports the same idea, that the “pur-
pose” of reconsolidation is updating, but demonstrates it in the 
opposite direction – a neutral contextual representation changed 
into a contextual fear memory. As we mentioned above, the idea 
that memories could be modified by the incorporation of new 
information available at the time of retrieval is an old tradition in 
cognitive psychology (Loftus, 1979). These ideas have now infil-
trated the study of human reconsolidation of amygdala-dependent 
memories. In the next section we discuss how these ideas are being 
systematically examined in the reconsolidation of declarative or 
episodic memories in humans as well.
Revisiting episodic memory
As mentioned above, Squire et al. (1976) observed a discrepancy 
between their findings in humans and previous results in animals 
when they failed to find evidence for memory disruption after 
reactivating declarative or episodic memories prior to ECS. They 
attributed this inconsistency to the different memory systems inves-
tigated, namely episodic versus emotional associative memories, 
respectively. Squire and colleagues argued that episodic memory 
simply provides a better model that is not confounded by arousal 
and motivational state. The use of this model system, they claimed, 
revealed  that  the  cue-dependent  amnesia  (i.e.,  reconsolidation 
blockade) is not a general characteristic of memory, but rather 
limited to very specific experimental conditions.
More recently, however, research with non-human animals have 
provided evidence that reconsolidation blockade is not unique to 
motivationally driven learning (see Nader and Hardt, 2009 for 
review).  Animal  studies  successfully  demonstrate  this  in  vari-
ous non-emotional tasks, such as spatial learning (Przybyslawski 
et al., 1999; Suzuki et al., 2004; Morris et al., 2006) and object 
recognition (Bozon et al., 2003; Kelly et al., 2003). Moreover, there 
In spite of the initial encouraging but incomplete results using 
propranolol  to  disrupt  fear  memory  reconsolidation  in  a  clini-
cal population (Brunet et al., 2008), the findings from controlled 
laboratory studies using a pharmacological manipulation to alter 
reconsolidation in humans have been problematic. The paradigms 
used have not targeted the reconsolidation mechanism (Kindt et al., 
2009), have been inconsistent across measures of fear (Soeter and 
Kindt, 2010), and when a post-reactivation manipulation was used, 
a long-lasting effect was not observed (Miller et al., unpublished). 
Nevertheless, these largely unsuccessful attempts represent an impor-
tant step in this research agenda. Each study provides insights into 
how future paradigms might be more successful. By understanding 
the problems and complexity of the pharmacological manipulation 
of reactivation and reconsolidation in humans, we may eventually be 
able to develop successful techniques that can be more precisely and 
effectively translated to the treatment of clinical disorders.
The last and most recent study to examine the reconsolidation 
of amygdala-dependent memories took a different approach. We 
(Schiller et al., 2010) again used a fear conditioning paradigm in 
healthy volunteers, but did not use propranolol to interfere with 
reconsolidation. Instead we used behaviorally induced interference 
by introducing new information about the value of the CS during 
the reconsolidation window. This approach capitalizes on recon-
solidation as an update mechanism. Instead of blocking reconsoli-
dation and the memory, this is an attempt to update the memory 
by allowing the incorporation of new information through the 
reconsolidation process. The advantage of this protocol is that it 
is non-invasive and thus relatively safe and easy to use in humans.
The experimental design included three groups and was con-
ducted over 3 days. The measure of fear was SCR. On Day 1, all 
subjects acquired conditioned fear to a colored square (the CS) 
paired with an electric shock (the US). Another colored square 
was also presented but never paired with the shock. On Day 2, two-
thirds of the subjects reactivated the fear memory by being exposed 
to a single presentation of the CS without the US. One-third did 
not receive the reactivation cue. Next, all the subjects underwent 
extinction training in which they were repeatedly exposed to the 
two colored squares without the shocks. For half of the subjects who 
received the reactivation cue, extinction training occurred after a 
delay of 10 min (allowing time for the reconsolidation process to 
start), and for the other half of the reactivated subjects, extinction 
occurred after 6 h (after the reconsolidation window was closed). 
We used extinction training in this paradigm to teach subjects that 
the previously aversive CS is now safe. During fear acquisition, the 
subjects form a CS–US memory trace. Standard extinction train-
ing (without prior reactivation) is thought to result in a second 
CS–noUS memory trace. After standard extinction training, these 
two memory representations about the value of the CS compete 
for expression. Because the initial CS–US trace is still available, 
fear can return with the passage of time (spontaneous recovery), 
stress (reinstatement) or in different contexts (renewal; see Bouton, 
2002 for a review). In our study, we hypothesized that if extinc-
tion training occurs during the reconsolidation process, while the 
original memory is being re-stored, this safety information may be 
incorporated into the original memory trace, rather than resulting 
in a second, alternative memory about the value of the CS, thus 
preventing the return of fear.
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events labile such that they could be modified and updated. Lee 
(2010) provided empirical evidence that hippocampal memory 
modification indeed selectively recruits reconsolidation mecha-
nisms. He demonstrated in animals, with a cellular approach, that 
reactivation of a neutral contextual representation destabilized it, 
allowing to incorporate emotionally salient information introduced 
within the same context.
Similar to the studies by Hupbach and colleagues, Forcato et al. 
(2007) also examined the reconsolidation of episodic memories 
using a paired-associate learning task. The subjects in this study 
learned to associate a list of cue syllables with their respective 
response syllables (a cue syllable, for example, would be “FLI” and 
the response syllable “AIO”). The reminder was a cue from this 
list, after which subjects learned a second list of paired associates. 
They found that introducing the reminder 5 min before training 
on the second list induced errors in the retention of the first list 
when tested 1 day later. The same group later demonstrated that 
the cue reminder ceased to be efficient when removing one of its 
components (Forcato et al., 2009). Lastly, they showed that the 
interference effect could turn into an update when subjects were 
explicitly instructed to do so (Forcato et al., 2010). Without direct 
instruction to update the first list, they simply made more errors 
while retrieving it after learning the second list post-reactivation. 
But when explicitly instructed to incorporate the new information, 
they retrieved the first list correctly in addition to items from the 
new paired-associate list.
In an effort to show selective impairment of a specific target 
episodic memory, Strange et al. (2010) examined reconsolidation of 
verbal memory interfered with an aversive facial expression. Their 
participants encoded various nouns on Day 1. The experimenter 
reactivated the memory for these nouns by presenting the word 
stems. The participants were asked to complete the stems out loud 
to make a word from Day 1. In this way, the authors made sure that 
reactivation of specific words from Day 1 was successful. They then 
examined the proportion of remembered words a Day later and a 
week later out of the words successfully reactivated on Day 2. They 
found impaired recall for those words preceding the presentation of 
a face with a fearful expression. The authors took these findings to 
suggest that reconsolidation of specific verbal memories in humans 
could be impaired using emotionally aversive stimuli.
Unlike the human reconsolidation studies on amygdala-depend-
ent memories described above, the recent research on reconsolida-
tion of hippocampal-dependent memories has relied on behavioral 
interference techniques. This may be due in part to the lack of an 
identified pharmacological agent that is safe for human use and 
has been shown to disrupt hippocampal reconsolidation in non-
human animals. Without such a drug, it is not possible to phar-
macologically disrupt hippocampal reconsolidation in humans. 
Nevertheless, the pharmacological research in non-human animals 
has inspired a revival in behavioral studies on this topic in humans. 
Interestingly, even though the behavioral interference paradigms 
used in recent human reconsolidation studies of episodic memory 
are similar to the one we used (Schiller et al., 2010) examining 
fear conditioning, the outcome is not. Our findings on amygdala-
dependent memory suggest the fear memory was updated and was 
no longer expressed. In contrast, studies of behavioral interference 
is clear evidence for reconsolidation blockade when specifically 
targeting  the  hippocampus.  For  example,  Debiec  et  al.  (2002) 
showed that intra-hippocampal injection of a protein synthesis 
inhibitor blocks contextual fear conditioning, which is known to be 
  hippocampal-dependent (Fanselow, 2000). Other studies showed 
effects of various pharmacological agents injected into the hip-
pocampus on reconsolidation of inhibitory avoidance (Milekic and 
Alberini, 2002; Boccia et al., 2004, 2007, 2010; Inda et al., 2011).
These findings suggest that reconsolidation is a general property 
of memory and is common to different memory systems. As in the 
emotional memory studies, Squire et al. (1976) were searching for 
“amnesia,” that is, impaired or a complete lack of memory, just 
as one would observe when interfering with consolidation of the 
initial learning. Indeed, they observed impaired recognition of a 
32-item list and lower retention of paired-associate learning when 
subjects learned less than 10 min before ECS. In contrast, ECS 
10 min after a reminder of this learning had no effect. It should be 
noted, however, that the effects of ECS on initial memory consoli-
dation were rather mild and in some cases marginally significant. 
Given this, it is questionable whether their ESC treatment could 
cause amnesia at all. 
The studies conducted in the last decade on human reconsoli-
dation of declarative or episodic memories searched for some-
thing other than amnesia. Much like the Schiller et al. (2010) 
study described above, they examined if the original memory was 
“updated” with the introduction of new information. For example, 
in a recent series of studies aimed at investigating episodic memory 
reconsolidation, Hupbach et al. (2007, 2009) examined how the 
reconsolidation of a list of random objects was affected by learn-
ing a second list. In their paradigm, the experimenter pulled out 
the items (e.g., balloon, envelope, tennis ball etc.) one at a time 
from a bag and put them in a distinct blue basket. Subjects were 
instructed to name the objects and to memorize them. One day 
later, the experimenter reminded half the subjects of the list by 
showing them the blue basket and prompted them to remember 
what happened with it (but not to recall the items). The other 
half went into another room with a different experimenter. All 
subjects at this point learned a new list. However they learned this 
list using a different procedure to avoid being reminded of the 
previous list. For the second list, the items were spread on a table 
and the subjects had to name and memorize them. On Day 3, the 
experimenter asked the subjects to remember as many items as 
possible from the Day 1 list.
Hupbach and colleagues found that the reminder in fact did 
not reduce the number of items recalled from the Day 1. Rather 
it resulted in subjects incorporating items from the Day 2 list into 
the Day 1 list. Complying with the reconsolidation protocol criteria 
outlined earlier, the authors also confirmed that (1) the intermixing 
of the items was unidirectional – no items from the Day 1 infil-
trated the Day 2 list, and (2) the effect did not occur immediately 
after learning the Day 2 list, but only 24 h later. In a follow up 
study these same investigators demonstrated that exposure to the 
context of the first list was a necessary and sufficient reminder in 
triggering reconsolidation of episodic memory, and a reminder 
outside of the spatial context was ineffective (Hupbach et al., 2008). 
The authors suggested that space plays a superior role in trigger-
ing memory reconsolidation by providing a “scaffold” to which 
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known about the neural basis of procedural memories than either 
fear memories or episodic memories, there is evidence that some 
types of procedural memories depend on the striatum (Knowlton 
et al., 1996; Poldrack et al., 2005), and motor skill learning in par-
ticular is thought to involve changes in the motor cortex and cer-
ebellum (Molinari et al., 1997; Middleton and Strick, 2000; Poldrack 
et al., 2005; Kantak et al., 2010).
In what is believed to be the first study to conclusively dem-
onstrate evidence for reconsolidation in humans, Walker et al. 
(2003) examined the reconsolidation of a motor skill memory 
using a finger-tapping task. On Day 1, participants learned a five-
during reconsolidation in episodic memory tasks find the   original 
memory is still expressed, but it is confused or merged with new 
information  presented  during  the  reconsolidation  window. As 
described in the next section, using a similar behavioral interference 
paradigm while examining a third type of memory (procedural 
memory), also yields a slightly different outcome.
Procedural or skill memory
By definition, procedural memories are non-declarative and gen-
erally do not require conscious awareness (White and McDonald, 
2002; Squire, 2004). The learning is incremental and requires the 
step-by-step execution of sensory or motor procedures (e.g., learn-
Table 1 | Memory systems and experimental paradigms in which reconsolidation has been examined in humans.
Type of memory Experimental paradigm Manipulation Dependent measure Outcome Reference
Procedural motor 
skills




learning of a new finger 
tapping sequence
Speed, accuracy Reduced accuracy Walker et al. 
(2003)




Recognition No effect Squire et al. 
(1976)
Remote memories Recall No effect
Episodic Learning list of items Post-reactivation 
interference through 
learning of a new list of 
items
Recall Memory of first list updated 
with words from second list, 
but not when learned in a 
new context
Hupbach 
et al. (2007 , 
2009)
Learning the new list in 
same or different context
Recall Hupbach 
et al. (2008)
Episodic Paired-associate learning Post-reactivation 
interference through 
learning of a new paired-
associate list of syllables
Cued recall More errors in recall of first 
but not second list
Forcato et al. 
(2007)
Omitting components of the 
reactivated syllable
Cued recall No effect Forcato et al. 
(2009)
Explicit instruction to update Cued recall Update of first list with items 
from second list
Forcato et al. 
(2010)




presentation of a fearful face













Reduced skin conductance 
and heart rate responses











Fear-potentiated startle went 
back to non-fearful level but 
no change in expectancy or 
skin conductance response














Skin conductance went back 
to non-fearful level









Transient reduction of skin 
conductance only in females 
and also without reactivation
Miller et al. 
(unpublished)
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the consequence of presenting interfering information during the 
reconsolidation window seems to differ. For amygdala-dependent 
expressions of fear learning, presenting safety information during 
reconsolidation appears to re-write or over-write the original fear 
memory (Schiller et al., 2010) because there is no evidence for the 
expression of the original memory as assessed by SCR. When exam-
ining hippocampal-dependent episodic memory, the primary con-
tent of this original episodic memory appears to be relatively intact 
following interference during reconsolidation, but the memory is 
now confused or merged with the interfering information. Finally, 
presenting an interfering motor skill during reconsolidation results 
in impaired expression of the original skill memory, but there still 
evidence that it exists, albeit in a degraded form.
There are at least two possible reasons why these different recon-
solidation/interference paradigms yield different patterns of results. 
The first obvious reason is the method of memory assessment. 
For example, if the episodic memory test used in the Hupbach 
et al. (2007, 2009) studies described earlier was an assessment of 
source memory, rather than memory for list items, their subjects 
would have tested as impaired in recounting the original memory. 
Similarly, in our study of fear conditioning (Schiller et al., 2010), 
explicit knowledge of the CS–US contingency throughout the study 
might have been unaffected. However, perhaps more important 
is the fact that the different memory systems examined in these 
human reconsolidation/interference studies have quite distinct pat-
terns of neural representation. It may primarily be these differences 
in the organization of the neural systems mediating these different 
types of memories that yield the diverse effects of interference dur-
ing reconsolidation on the behavioral outcome.
For example, as outlined earlier, fear conditioning results in a 
CS–US association whose neural representation is localized in a 
relatively discrete manner in a small region of the amygdala (i.e., 
the lateral amygdala – see LeDoux, 2000 for a review). In contrast, 
hippocampal-dependent episodic memory is not believed to be 
stored solely in the hippocampus. Instead, it is suggested that the 
hippocampus acts to pull together or associate a cortical network 
of discrete representations that make up the components of the 
episode or event. The episodic memory representation itself is the 
cortical network that is tied together by the hippocampus. In con-
trast to conditioned fear memories, the episodic memory trace is 
the opposite of localized. It is widespread and distributed through-
out the brain, although the binding of this network relies on the 
hippocampus (see Davachi, 2006; Dickerson and Eichenbaum, 2010 
for reviews). Finally, although less is known about the neural rep-
resentation of procedural or skill memories, the existing evidence 
suggests that it is neither as localized as amygdala-dependent condi-
tioned fear, nor as distributed as hippocampal-dependent episodic 
memory (Knowlton et al., 1996; Poldrack et al., 2005; Kantak et al., 
2010). Rather, is depends on a restricted number of regions includ-
ing the motor cortex, the striatum and the cerebellum.
If we view the behavioral interference results for conditioned 
fear (Schiller et al., 2010), episodic memory (e.g., Hupbach et al., 
2007), and motor skill memory (Walker et al., 2003) in light of their 
unique underlying neural representations, the different behavioral 
outcomes of presenting interfering information during reconsolida-
tion is understandable. Given the neurally localized and relatively 
element sequence comprised of four numeric keys (for example, 
“4-1-3-2-4”) in a 12-trial training session. On Day 2, they had a 
brief reactivation of that memory using a three-trial retention ses-
sion, after which they learned a novel five-element sequence. On 
the next day they were tested on both sequences. The measures of 
learning were speed and accuracy when performing the practiced 
sequences, in contrast to a random sequence.
Walker et al. (2003) found that the initial improvement achieved 
when learning the first sequence on Day 1 was diminished when 
tested on Day 3 (accuracy decreased by 50% and speed was non-
significantly worse). This was due to reminding subjects of the 
first sequence on Day 2 before training on the second sequence. 
The investigators did not observe a decrease in performance on 
a short-term memory test of performance on the first sequence 
immediately after learning the second sequence on Day 2. They also 
did not observe a change in performance of the second sequence, 
which in fact got better from Day 2 (training) to Day 3 (test). A 
similar improvement was observed for the first sequence when 
tested on Day 2 (initial retention/reactivation).
The Walker et al. (2003) paradigm satisfies the three criteria of 
tests of reconsolidation outlined by Lewis and colleagues in the 
1960s (Misanin et al., 1968, Lewis, 1969): (1) the memory is reac-
tivated; (2) the intervention occurs during reconsolidation and not 
before; (3) the test for retention occurs after the reconsolidation 
window has closed. In addition, a test of performance on the first 
sequence immediately after interference by the second sequence 
shows intact short-term memory. For this motor skill task, the 
behavioral interference paradigm resulted in impaired perform-
ance, although there was still some evidence of expression of the 
original skill memory. Below, we speculate as to why behavioral 
interference paradigms examining human reconsolidation may 
result in different patterns of performance when investigating dif-
ferent memory systems.
behAviorAl interference of reconsolidAtion Across different 
memory systems
One of the most important findings to emerge from memory 
research in the last century is that there are multiple forms of 
memory that are independent and have distinct neural repre-
sentations  (see  White  and  McDonald,  2002;  Squire,  2004  for 
reviews). Although these memory systems may have unique neural 
signatures, they also interact. For example, as mentioned above, 
experiencing a fear conditioning paradigm engages at least two 
of these memory systems. The amygdala is critical for the simple 
CS–US association and the physiological expression of this learn-
ing, whereas the hippocampus is necessary for episodic, explicit 
knowledge of the CS–US relationship (Bechara et al., 1995; LaBar 
et al., 1995), as well as the contextual modulation of physiological 
fear expression (Fanselow, 2000, LaBar and Phelps, 2005). We may 
be able differentiate the engagement of different memory systems 
by their means of expression, the task, or the qualities of learning 
(e.g., incremental or immediate), but at times their interaction may 
make this differentiation difficult (Cohen et al., 1997; Willingham, 
1998; Foerde et al., 2006; Olsson and Phelps, 2007).
In our review of the current literature on reconsolidation in 
humans, it is clear that the behavioral interference paradigms thus far 
have been the most successful at demonstrating evidence for recon-
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and LeDoux, 2004), using this drug in humans was not as effective 
(Brunet et al., 2008; Soeter and Kindt, 2010; Miller et al., unpublished).
Why propranolol appears to be less effective in disrupting the 
reconsolidation of fear memories in humans is unclear, but it is 
possible to identify some factors that can be assessed in future 
studies. First, the animal research used a much higher dose than 
the equivalent dose in humans. Future studies in humans might 
increase the dose and future research in rats could determine if a 
systemically delivered lower dose equivalent to one that humans 
can safely use is effective. Second, there is reason to believe that 
human conditioned fear responses may be driven by both simple 
CS–US associations and top-down knowledge of the CS–US contin-
gency (Olsson and Phelps, 2007). The interaction of these different 
memory representations likely play an important role in fear related 
disorders as well. The human pharmacological studies to date have 
not intentionally and systematically manipulated these independ-
ent memory representations. It is possible that future interference 
and  pharmacological  studies  examining  reconsolidation  could 
independently manipulate these different memory representations 
to understand and clarify how their interaction may be linked to the 
effectiveness of pharmacological interventions. Finally, propranolol 
has only been shown to be effective in altering reconsolidation in 
amygdala-dependent cued fear conditioning (Debiec and LeDoux, 
2004; Muravieva and Alberini, 2010). The development of safe bio-
logical interventions that may impact the reconsolidation of other 
types of memory and memory systems, or additional ones that 
impact amygdala-dependent memory, would greatly enhance our 
understanding of the details of human reconsolidation processes.
Because most of the recent research on reconsolidation in non-
human animals has focused on fear conditioning, human research 
on this type of memory has been able benefit. To date, this has 
been less true for human research examining reconsolidation of 
other memory systems. This is apparent not only in the lack of 
potential pharmacological manipulations, but also in factors that 
may be relevant to behavioral interference paradigms. For exam-
ple, the research on fear memory consolidation in rats provides 
some information about the timing of when the reconsolidation 
window “opens” and when it “closes.” A similar understanding of 
the reconsolidation timing for hippocampal-dependent memories 
might allow researcher to develop more nuanced interference para-
digms that may help differentiate between memories that are inte-
grated and bound through the reconsolidation process verses those 
that are simply forgotten or blocked from expression. Integrating 
insights from neurobiological models of hippocampal reconsoli-
dation (Milekic and Alberini, 2002; Inda et al., 2011) with human 
reconsolidation/interference paradigms may also help address some 
of the old debates that emerged concerning the malleability of 
memory in the cognitive psychology literature.
Finally, although reconsolidation is known to be a memory 
updating mechanism, this view of reconsolidation has been more 
apparent in research on humans, perhaps because of the lack of safe 
pharmacological manipulations. If reconsolidation serves to update 
memories, rather than block them, then we might extend our 
current reconsolidation/interference paradigms, in both humans 
and other animals, to more precisely manipulate this process. For 
example, the type of interference, interference (blockade or update) 
simple representation of the CS–US association that drives the 
expression of conditioned fear, one might expect that updating the 
original memory with safety information could so fundamentally 
alter the representation of the value of the CS as to eliminate the 
expression of the conditioned fear response. In contrast, episodic 
memory for a list of items is thought to be represented as a dis-
tributed, but bound, cortical network. Introducing a new list of 
items, or a new mnemonic network, while the original memory is 
undergoing reconsolidation might simply serve to merge or bind 
the two memory networks together, as opposed to re-writing the 
original memory. If this is the case, one might expect the primary 
consequence not to be reflected as impaired memory for the original 
list items, but rather impaired memory for the source of the items, 
as Hupbach et al. (2009) observed. The effect of interference on skill 
memories does not appear to eliminate the expression of the original 
memory (as in fear conditioning), nor leave it relatively intact (as 
in episodic memory). Instead, the effect of behavioral interference 
on skill memories is an impairment with some expression of the 
original memory, consistent with a neural representation of this 
memory that is neither discretely localized, nor widely distributed.
the future of humAn reconsolidAtion reseArch
In contrast to research with non-human animals, research examin-
ing reconsolidation in humans has been slow to emerge and the 
data is not nearly as compelling. Although there appears to be good 
evidence for a reconsolidation mechanism across memory systems 
in humans using behavioral interference techniques (e.g., Walker 
et al., 2003; Hupbach et al., 2007: Schiller et al., 2010), these tech-
niques are subject to many of the same concerns that arose when 
trying to understand the nature of memory representation in cogni-
tive studies of memory malleability in the 1980s. That is, behavioral 
data alone cannot provide conclusive evidence of a permanently 
altered memory representation following reconsolidation. Since 
that time, however, new techniques for examining human brain 
function have been developed. The conjunction of human brain 
function with behavioral interference during reconsolidation may 
provide support for an altered mnemonic representation. Although 
changes in the underlying neural signature should be observed 
across memory systems, the best possibility for clear evidence 
of  influencing  a  reconsolidation  mechanism  through  interfer-
ence may come from studies of fear conditioning. The successful 
reconsolidation/interference paradigm in humans (Schiller et al., 
2010) combined with extensive knowledge of the localized neural 
representation of this simple type of learning that has been inves-
tigated across species (Phelps and LeDoux, 2005) leads to specific 
hypothesis that can be confirmed. For example, the ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex is known to be critical in the expression of extinc-
tion learning (Phelps et al., 2004; Quirk and Mueller, 2008), but this 
region should not be equally involved if the amygdala-dependent 
fear representation is altered during reconsolidation.
A critical factor that has enabled the proliferation of research on 
reconsolidation in non-human animals is a detailed understanding of 
the synaptic processes needed for memory storage and the availability 
of drugs that block this process. This same factor may explain why 
human reconsolidation research is so slow to emerge. It is simply not 
possible to use these same powerful pharmacological manipulations in 
humans. As outlined above, even when a drug safe for human use was 
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